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This Policy Brief focuses on Euro-Mediterranean relations in the field of 
security. It analyses the treatment given to the security agenda in the Barcelona 
Process, noting that regional conflicts have undermined the development of 
cooperation in this field and that the partners have opted for the more 
pragmatic approach of bilateral or sub-regional frameworks. The paper also 
looks at the new Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) and finds that, as far as 
security cooperation is concerned, there is a significant degree of continuity: the 
UfM remains hostage to the Arab-Israeli conflict, while attempting to work on 
politically less sensitive issues (such as civil protection) and exploring more 
flexible formats. Given this situation, the authors argue for a redoubling of the 
EU’s efforts towards a Middle East Peace Process, and for a strategy on how to 
deal with security cooperation, even in adverse situations. 
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verything seemed to indicate that the Euro-Mediterranean partnership was entering a new 
phase on the 13
th of July 2008. The Paris summit gave birth to the Union for the 
Mediterranean (UfM) under the auspices of France, with the cooperation of Egypt and 
the acquiescence of all the countries of the EU and the majority of the Mediterranean countries, 
with the exception of Libya. This Union was thus launched and captured the attention of the 
international community. But not before it was obliged to undergo substantial modification in 
order to accommodate the criticism levelled at it from both shores of the Mediterranean. Indeed, 
this modification went so far as to transform the very nature of the project. The initiative, which 
was first conceived as an alternative to the Barcelona Process and the European Neigbourhood 
Policy, evolved to complement the already existing initiatives and in the end, incorporated the 
‘Barcelona  acquis’ as a new phase of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. Under these 
circumstances, it is understandable that both analysts and stakeholders find themselves 
wondering where the novelty is in this new phase.  
This Policy Brief focuses on changes and continuities in the field of security. It starts with a 
brief analysis of the dynamics that have characterised the treatment given to the security agenda 
in the Barcelona Process. It then explains the transition towards the UfM. Next, it analyses the 
treatment given to this agenda in the UfM and finally, as the ultimate goal of this paper, it 
outlines possible guidelines for action to boost dialogue and cooperation on security matters in 
the framework of the Union for the Mediterranean. 
1.  The Barcelona Process and the security agenda 
The Barcelona Process was initiated in 1995 and undertook to enhance an area of peace and 
stability. From the very beginning it was involved in a double dynamic. On the one hand, this 
framework was affected by the escalations of the conflict in the Middle East, which did not 
block the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership but prevented substantial progress in many spheres of 
cooperation, especially in the field of security. On the other hand, there have been attempts to 
revitalise, strengthen and even reinvent a framework that, despite its enormous virtues, did not 
manage to meet the objectives initially established.  
The effects of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the Barcelona Process can best be illustrated by the 
impossibility of reaching a consensus on a Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability 
in the year 2000. The partners of the Barcelona Process thus opted for a more pragmatic 
approach. Not only was any attempt to operate in the framework of regional conflicts ruled out, 
but expectations were also lowered. Hence, bilateral cooperation channels were given priority, 
for instance within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). In the 
multilateral field, cooperation and dialogue have focused on aspects that are mid-way between 
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domestic and external security, such as the fight against terrorism, and less sensitive political 
issues, such as civil protection. At the same time, sub-regional frameworks such as the ‘5+5’ 
(the sub-regional dialogue bringing together Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Malta, Morocco, 
Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya on issues such as foreign affairs, defence, interior, 
transportation, etc.) have gained momentum, profiting from the fact that they are less vulnerable 
to the escalade of regional conflicts in the Middle East. Southern Mediterranean officials, and 
particularly those working on security matters, feel more at ease in informal and flexible 
formats, where smaller and more pragmatic projects are implemented and where its members 
are on an equal footing. 
The issues of migration and border control deserve a special mention here as they have been 
increasingly securitised. Present on the Euro-Mediterranean agenda since the very beginning, 
the first differences of opinion between EU and Mediterranean Partners on this area emerged 
when drafting the Barcelona Declaration. Countries such as Spain and France demanded 
commitments regarding readmission agreements, while North African countries asked for the 
rights of regular migrants living in the EU to be ensured. Such a gap in perceptions and 
priorities explains the lack of progress in this specific area during the second half of the nineties. 
Later on, several factors, such as the increasing importance for the EU of the Justice and Home 
Affairs agenda since the Tampere European Council, the tragic deaths of irregular migrants in 
the Mediterranean Sea and the increasing attention given to the fight against terrorism, 
contributed to assuring the place of JHA on the Euro-Mediterranean agenda in 2002. 
Nonetheless, it was not until 2005 that these aspects were included as an independent chapter in 
the Barcelona Process. The thinking behind this inclusion was that an effective dialogue and 
cooperation on migration control could not exclusively rely on security actions and that a more 
comprehensive approach, which would include developmental policies, should be implemented 
in cooperation with the Mediterranean partners and their African neighbours. In fact, since 2005 
we can observe that some North-African countries are more willing to cooperate with the EU on 
migration control as irregular migration has become an internal problem in some of these 
countries as well. 
In more general terms, two shortcomings of the Barcelona Process should be highlighted as they 
have also had an impact on the management of the security agenda. The first is that certain 
dimensions of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, such as trade liberalisation, have been given 
priority. The Barcelona Process relied on the belief that trade liberalisation, together with 
accompanying measures, would result in progress and development and pave the path of 
political openness in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries. Those future 
democratic governments would give up violence as a tool to settle differences. Tracing a causal 
chain whose starting point was the economic dimension, the practice of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership overlooked the fact that the Barcelona Process had been designed in such a way as 
to achieve the harmonious development of the political, economic and social agenda. 
A second structural problem affecting Euro-Mediterranean relations is the asymmetry of 
leadership between north and south and, consequently, the Mediterranean partners’ weak 
identification with the Barcelona Process. These patterns shape a relation that, despite being 
initially designed in terms of equality, in practice ended up adopting a donor-recipient approach. 
In the field of security this resulted, on the one hand, in an agenda tailored to the needs and 
concerns of the European countries and, on the other hand, in a widespread perception of the 
Southern Mediterranean countries as territories in which the EU could delocalise some of its EU 
security policies (e.g. detention camps for irregular migrants). 
2.  From the Barcelona Process to the Union for the Mediterranean 
The UfM is not just a name given to a new phase of the Barcelona Process but is an attempt at 
revitalisation and reform. It is also an evolution of the initiative proposed by Nicolas Sarkozy, 3 
which moved further away from the European logic as a result of pressure exerted on him by 
actors such as the European Commission, Italy, Spain and Germany, in particular. 
One of the most significant changes relates to the new institutional setting (i.e. the creation of a 
co-presidency and a permanent secretariat). The aim of this reform is twofold: to increase 
political dialogue and to achieve a more egalitarian relationship between the EU countries and 
the Mediterranean partners. In order to meet this goal, regular Euro-Mediterranean summits and 
more frequent ministerial meetings should be held. Alongside this, a new co-presidency will 
enshrine a greater balance between the EU and its partners. It was also agreed that a secretariat 
for the UfM be set up, outside the communitarian framework, with its headquarters in 
Barcelona. This secretariat should play an important role in raising funds for a new type of 
cooperation project.  
The cooperation projects will focus on six areas: solar energy, civil protection, higher education 
and the Euro-Mediterranean university, de-pollution of the Mediterranean, business 
development initiatives and maritime and land highways. Unlike the traditional Euro-
Mediterranean cooperation, the UfM invites its members to opt for flexible multilateralism (not 
all the countries need to be involved in every single project) and they are supposed to find new 
sources of finance, be they public or private.  
These changes in the functioning of the UfM reflect new priorities. While energy became more 
important, other dimensions of the Barcelona Process, such as the promotion of democracy, the 
safeguard of human rights or the enhancement of the role of civil society have remained in the 
background. In other words, the traditional emphasis on economic cooperation still prevails 
over any other aspect of the action plans. Obviously, this has an impact on the attention given to 
security issues. 
3.  The Union for the Mediterranean and security issues 
The original idea put forward by Sarkozy to set up a Mediterranean Union overlooked security 
and defence issues. The speech given in Tangiers on October 2007 is an example of this. In this 
speech, the elected President of the French Republic pointed to sustainable development, 
energy, transport and water as the spheres in which it was necessary to put the greatest efforts, 
but there was no mention of security. In fact, some of the initial approaches intending to exclude 
the Middle East countries from the launch of the Union for the Mediterranean went along the 
same lines: to minimise the impact of regional conflicts, especially of the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
Nevertheless, security issues were cautiously uploaded onto the UfM agenda. Firstly, the 
foundational text of the UfM not only mentioned the goals set by the Barcelona Declaration but 
ratified the aspiration to promote disarmament processes, a Middle East free of weapons of 
mass destruction and the implementation of confidence-building measures. However, as in the 
Barcelona Process, there is little hope of overcoming this challenge and moving from rhetoric to 
action.  
Secondly, in line with the Barcelona Process, it included cooperation in civil protection as the 
only project related to security issues. As the text mentioned above, this is a less politically 
sensitive issue than disarmament or regional conflict. Nobody questions the fact that the 
achievements in cooperation concerning civil protection, for example through an early warning 
and response mechanism at a Euro-Mediterranean level, could have a positive impact on the 
daily security of citizens within the Euro-Mediterranean area. Moreover, this field can easily 
lend itself to the development of multilateral and flexible projects that do not necessarily 
involve every partner of the UfM. Hence, this fits in with the new UfM working methodology.   
Thirdly, we observe that UfM texts condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, 
referring to the Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism, established in 4 
2005. Nevertheless, no significant progress has been made in reaching a consensus on the 
definition of terrorism. This does not seem to be a priority in the UfM’s dialogue framework. 
Fourthly, it is worth recalling that many analysts interpreted the French President’s proposal to 
create a Mediterranean Union as a platform to push for greater cooperation in the fight against 
irregular migration. However, there has not been any substantive step in that direction; 
migration control is almost absent from the UfM debates and the Paris summit recently 
confirmed the need to promote an orderly and managed legal migration, in order to combat 
illegal migration and foster links between migration and development through a comprehensive, 
balanced and integrated approach. Thus, there is no significant evolution in the treatment of 
migration compared to the approach of the Barcelona Process. This does not mean that the EU 
members do not try to push their southern neighbours to tighten the control of their borders. It 
simply means that European countries prefer to express these demands through bilateral 
channels rather than within a multilateral framework. 
Fifthly, it becomes clear that the Arab-Israeli conflict remains a serious obstacle for the 
development of the UfM. Forms of flexible multilateralism as foreseen in the UfM could 
contribute to bypass certain difficulties. However, the reinforcement of political dialogue and 
the enhancement of the new institutional structure, especially the co-presidency, expose the 
UfM to the ups and downs of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Gaza crisis towards at end of 2008 
or the announced suspension of Istanbul’s meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers’ (scheduled in 
November 2009) illustrate the increased vulnerability of the UfM. 
4.  Guidelines to foster cooperation in the domain of security  
Many believe that currently – with the open and long-lasting Arab-Israeli conflict – Euro-
Mediterranean cooperation in the domain of security is unlikely to achieve any substantial 
results. Members of the UfM therefore have four different options: (1) to abandon any ambition 
in this field; (2) to try and go to the root of the problem, (3) to try to bypass the current obstacles 
and explore new ways of cooperation or (4) to continue with the current ambiguity.  
We believe that the first and the fourth options are detrimental to both the EU’s long-term 
interests and contradict the spirit of the European Security Strategy, which points to the need to 
continue the “engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, 
security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process”. However, the 
European Security Strategy also affirms that “the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a 
strategic priority for Europe” and that “without this, there will be little chance of dealing with 
other problems in the Middle East”. Thus, it seems that the EU itself acknowledges that there is 
a need to go to the root of the problem.  
At this point, we are facing the crux of the matter: do the EU and its member states have any 
capacity to change the course of the events in the Middle East? The EU is aware of the fact that 
it does not have the capacity to go it alone or much less deal with divergent points of view 
within the EU, as was the case during the war in Lebanon in 2006 and the offensive in Gaza in 
2008-09. However, if the EU holds a common and coherent position and achieves a transatlantic 
consensus and roadmap on this issue, it can make an effective contribution to the resumption of 
the Middle East Peace Process. 
If this peace process remains deadlocked, the EU and the Mediterranean partners should at least 
explore how they can keep the channels of communication open. Since this is the most likely 
scenario, this paper concludes with the following specific recommendations: 
¾  Keep multilateral dialogue alive. Even if the UfM is unlikely to obtain results in the field of 
security and is facing the same problems as the Barcelona Process, it is nonetheless a 
valuable framework. It should be kept in a state of semi-hibernation, ready to be used again 
if the circumstances in the Middle East permit it. 5 
¾  Preserve valuable aspects of the Barcelona acquis. Among these aspects one could note 
general orientations, such as the idea that parallel progress is needed in the political, 
security, economic and cultural arenas. Also sectoral elements such as cooperation in civil 
protection or the comprehensive approach when tackling migration should be preserved. 
¾  Be aware that the most sensitive issues in the domain of security will be discussed and 
implemented at a bilateral or subregional level. This is particularly true if the Arab-Israeli 
conflict continues to block regional-scale dialogue. However, even if this were solved, the 
most delicate issues would continue to be discussed in smaller and more informal fora, 
where secrecy prevails. 
¾  Preserve the core values that the EU is supposed to protect and project. The EU and its 
member states should keep in mind that cooperation in the domain of security with third 
countries’ authorities will only be useful if ordinary citizens benefit from it and it does not 
compromise the rights and liberties of the citizens of either the EU, or the partner countries. 